ptation to
unthriftiness. When Caius renewed his brother's laws he purposely
charged the land distributed to the poor with a yearly vectigal.
How different was this from the mere demagogic trick of Drusus!
It appears, then, that the Lex Frumentaria of Caius is not the
indefensible measure which modern writers, filled with modern notions,
have called it. It has, moreover, been well said that it was a kind
of poor-law; and, even if bad in itself, may have been the least bad
remedy for the pauperism which not Caius, but senatorial misgovernment
had brought about. No doubt it conferred popularity on Caius, and no
doubt his popularity was acceptable to him; but there is no ground for
believing that his noble nature deliberately stooped to demoralise the
mob for selfish motives.

[Sidenote: His Lex Judiciaria.] One great party, however, he had thus
won over to his side. The Lex Judiciaria gained over the equites
also. It has been before explained that the equites at this time were
non-senatorial rich men. Senators were forbidden by law to mix in
commerce, though no doubt they evaded the law. Between the senatorial
and moneyed class there was a natural ill-will, which Caius proceeded
to use and increase. His exact procedure we do not know for certain.
According to some authorities he made the judices eligible from the
equites only, instead of from the Senate. In the epitome of Livy it is
stated that 600 of the equites were to be added to the number of the
senators, so that the equites should have twice as much power as the
Senate itself. This at first sight seems nonsense. But Caius may have
proposed that for judicial purposes 600 equites should form, as it
were, a second chamber, which, being twice as numerous, would permit
two judices for every senatorial judex. In form he may have devised
that 'counter-senate,' which, as it has been shown, he in fact
created. [Sidenote: The effects of it. The Senate abased, the equites
exalted.] But whether Caius provided that all the judices or only
two-thirds of them should be chosen from the equites, and in whatever
way he did so, he did succeed in exalting the moneyed class and
abasing the Senate. In civil processes, and in the permanent and
temporary commissions for the administration of justice, the equites
were henceforth supreme. Even the senators themselves depended on
their verdict for acquittal or condemnation, and the chief power in
the State had changed hands. Of course the ch