er
whatever climate their destiny hath placed them. What else but
considerations of this nature could have influenced the merchants of the
freest nation, at that time in the world, to embark in so nefarious a
traffic, as that of the human race, attended, as the African slave trade
has been, with the most atrocious aggravations of cruelty, perfidy, and
intrigues, the objects of which have been the perpetual fomentation of
predatory and intestine wars? What, but similar considerations, could
prevail on the government of the same country, even in these days, to
patronize a commerce so diametrically opposite to the generally received
maxims of that government. It is to the operation of these
considerations in the parent country, not less than to their influence
in the colonies, that the rise, increase, and continuance of slavery in
those British colonies which now constitute united America, are to be
attributed, as I shall endeavour to shew in the course of the present
enquiry. It is now time to enquire into the nature of slavery, in
general, and take a view of its consequences, and attendants in this
commonwealth, in particular.

[Footnote 4: Dr. Belknap's answers to St. G. T.'s queries.]

[Footnote 5: Letter from Zephaniah Swift to St. G. T.]

Slavery, says a well informed writer [Hargrave's case of Negroe
Somerset.] on the subject, has been attended with circumstances so
various in different countries, as to render it difficult to give a
general definition of it. Justinian calls it a constitution of the law
of nations, by which one man is made subject to another, contrary to
nature [Lib. 1. Tit. 3. Sect. 2.]. Grotius describes it to be an
obligation to serve another for life, in consideration of diet, and
other common necessaries [Lib. 2. c. 5. Sect. 27]. Dr. Rutherforth,
rejecting this definition, informs us, that perfect slavery is an
obligation to be directed by another in all one's actions [Lib. 1. c.
20. pa. 474.]. Baron Montesquieu defines it to be the establishment of a
right, which gives one man such a power over another, as renders him
absolute master over his life and fortune [Lib. 15. c. 1.]. These
definitions appear not to embrace the subject fully, since they respect
the condition of the slave, in regard to his _master_, only, and not in
regard to the _state_, as well as the _master_. The author last
mentioned observes, that the constitution of a state may be free, and
the subject not so. The subject free