e property of the slave also is absolutely the property
of his master, the slave himself being the subject of property, and as
such saleable, or transmissible at the will of his master.--A slavery,
so malignant as that described, does not leave to its wretched victims
the least vestige of any civil right, and even divests them of all their
natural rights. It does not, however, appear, that the rigours of
slavery in this country were ever as great, as those above described:
yet it must be confessed, that, at times, they have fallen very little
short of them.

The first severe law respecting slaves, now to be met with in our code,
is that of 1669, already mentioned, which declared that the death of a
slave _resisting_ his master, or other person correcting him by his
order, _happening by extremity of the correction_, should not be
accounted felony. The alterations which this law underwent in three
successive acts [1705. c. 49. 1723, c. 4. 1748. c. 31.], were by no
means calculated effectually to mitigate its severity; it seems rather
to have been augmented by the act of 1723, which declared that a person
indicted for the murder of a slave, and found guilty of _manslaughter_,
should not incur any punishment for the same.[16]

[Footnote 16: In December term 1788, one John Huston was tried in the
general court for the murder of a slave; the jury found him guilty of
manslaughter, and the court, upon a motion in arrest of judgment,
discharged him without any punishment. The general assembly being then
sitting, some of the members of the court mentioned the case to some
leading characters in the legislature, and the act was at the same
session repealed.]

All these acts were at length repealed in 1788 [1788. 2. 23.]. So that
homicide of a slave stands now upon the same footing, as in the case of
any other person. In 1672 it was declared lawful for any person pursuing
any runaway Negroe, mulattoe, Indian slave, or _servant for life_, by
virtue of an _hue and cry_, to kill them in case of resistance, without
being questioned for the same [1672. c. 8.]. A few years afterwards this
act was extended to persons _employed to apprehend_ runaways [1680. c.
10.]. In 1705, these acts underwent some small alteration; two justices
being authorised by proclamation to _outlaw_ runaways, who might
thereafter be _killed_ and destroyed by any person whatsoever, by _such
ways and means_ as he may think fit, without accusation or impeachment
of