slave [1748. c. 31.], but that proviso is omitted in the
act of 1792, and the justices moreover seem bound to allow him counsel
for his defence, whose fee shall be paid by his master [Edit. 1794. c.
103.] In case of conviction, execution of the sentence was probably very
speedily performed, since the act of 1748, provides that, thereafter, it
should not be performed in less than ten days, except in case of
insurrection or rebellion; and further, that if the court be divided in
opinion the accused should be acquitted. In 1764, an act passed,
authorizing general, instead of special, commissioners of oyer and
terminer [1764. c. 9.], constituting all the justices of any county,
judges for the trial of slaves, committing capital offences, within
their respective counties; any four of whom, one being of the quorum,
should constitute a court for that purpose. In 1772 one step further was
made in favour of humanity, by an act declaring that no slave should
thereafter be condemned to die unless four of the court should concur in
opinion of his guilt [1772. c. 9.]. The act of 1786, c. 58, confirmed by
that of 1792, constitutes the justices of every county and corporation
justices of oyer and terminer for the trial of slaves [Edit. 1794. c.
103.]; requires _five_ justices, at least, to constitute a court, and
_unanimity_ in the court for his condemnation; allows him counsel for
his defence, to be paid by his owner, and, I apprehend, admits him to
object to the proceedings against him; and finally enlarges the time of
execution to _thirty_ days, instead of ten (except in cases of
conspiracy, insurrection, or rebellion), and extends the benefit of
clergy to him in all cases, where any other person should have the
benefit thereof, except in the cases before mentioned.

To an attentive observer these gradual, and almost imperceptible
amendments in our jurisprudence respecting slaves, will be found, upon
the whole, of infinite importance to that unhappy race. The mode of
trial in criminal cases, especially, is rendered infinitely more
beneficial to them, than formerly, though perhaps still liable to
exception for want of the aid of a jury: the solemnity of an oath
administered the moment the trial commences, may be considered as
operating more forcibly on the mind, than a general oath of office,
taken, perhaps, twenty years before. Unanimity may also be more readily
expected to take place among _five_ men, than among _twelve_. These
o