Burgoyne's
fell back to Duer's again. Meantime, Frazer had repaired his bridge and
hastily recrossed the Hudson. Riedesel's corps was sent back to Fort
Edward. The whole army had thus made a retrograde movement in
consequence of the defeat at Bennington, and now lay in _echelon_[35]
from Fort Edward to Batten-Kill, in the camps it had occupied before the
advance was begun; it had retreated upon its communications; it was put
on the defensive.
Burgoyne had now no choice left but to hold fast his communication with
the lakes, and these could not be called safe while a victorious enemy
was threatening his flank. From this time forward, he grew wary and
circumspect. His councils began to be divided. The prestige of the army
was lowered, confidence in its leaders visibly shaken. Even the soldiers
began to grumble, criticise, and reflect. Burgoyne's vain boast that
this army would not retreat, no longer met the conditions in which it
stood. It had retreated.
As if to prove the truth of the adage that misfortunes never come
singly, most of Burgoyne's Indians now deserted him. So far from
intimidating, their atrocities had served to arouse the Americans as
nothing else could. As soldiers, they had usually run away at the first
fire. As scouts, their minds were wholly fixed upon plundering. Burgoyne
had sharply rebuked them for it. Ever sullen and intractable under
restraint, their answer was at least explicit, "No plunder, no Indians;"
and they were as good as their word.
We find, then, that the battle of Bennington had cost Burgoyne not far
from two thousand men, whether soldiers or Indians. More than this, it
had thrown him back upon his second alternative, which, we remember, was
to halt until supplies could be brought from Canada. This was easily
equivalent to a month's delay. Thirty days of inaction were thus forced
upon Burgoyne at a time when every one of them was worth five hundred
men to the Americans. Such were some of the substantial results of the
victory at Bennington.
To the Americans, the moral and material gains were no less striking or
important. At once confidence was restored. Men no longer hesitated to
turn out, or feared for the result. A most hopeful sign was the alacrity
with which the well-to-do farmers went into the ranks. There was general
appreciation of the fact that Burgoyne had seriously compromised himself
by advancing as far as he had; in short, the re-action was quite as
decisive as tha
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