hope of crushing out his enemies in the valley.

XI.

OUR ARMY ADVANCES.

[Sidenote: Refer to Chapter V., "Facing Disaster."]

[Sidenote: Aug. 4.]

We remember that the united voice of the army and people had demanded
the recall of those generals whose want of foresight or energy, or both,
had caused the disasters with which the campaign had opened. Congress
chose General Gates[41] to command in room of Schuyler, who, with St.
Clair, was ordered to report at headquarters. With the methods of travel
then in use, Gates was nearly two weeks in getting from Philadelphia to
Albany. This fact will sufficiently illustrate the difficulties which
attended the movement of reenforcements from one army to another, before
the day of railways and steamboats.

All that lay in the power of man to do, Washington had done for the
Northern army. Though fronting an enemy greatly superior to himself, he
had still found time to so direct operations in the North, that his hand
may almost be said to have guided the course of events in that quarter.
He had soothed Schuyler's wounded self-love, commended his efforts,
strengthened his hands in the field, and nobly stood between him and his
detractors in Congress. When Congress had suspended all the generals of
the Northern army from command, it was Washington who interposed to
save them and the army from the consequences of such blindness and
folly. To Schuyler he had said, "Burgoyne is doing just what we could
wish; let him but continue to scatter his army about, and his ruin is
only a question of time." Schuyler urgently called for more troops.
Brigade after brigade had gone from Washington's own army to swell
Schuyler's ranks. "I care not where the victory is won, so we do but
gain it," Washington said. Schuyler again pleaded his want of general
officers. Washington sent him Arnold, the dare-devil of the army, and
Lincoln, a man of sound head, steady hand, and even temper, as a
counterpoise to Arnold's over-confident and impetuous nature. Thanks to
these efforts, we had created a new army on the ruins of the old.

Schuyler's deportment toward the Massachusetts authorities at this time
was neither conciliatory nor conducive to the interests of the service.
He knew their feelings of distrust toward him, and in making application
to them for reenforcements showed his resentment in a way that called
forth an acrimonious response. He upbraided them for their shortcomings;
they entr