part of Russia, for
he immediately appropriated for the support of Rumania between eight and
ten army corps, which were instantly placed in motion, regardless of the
adverse condition their absence caused on his own front. It is quite
true that these troops arrived too late to save Bucharest; but that they
came as quickly as possible, I can assert without reservation, for I was
on the various lines of communication for nearly a month and found them
blocked with these corps, which represented the cream of the Russian
army, to make good the moral obligations of Russia to Rumania. In
November I had a talk with Brussiloff, who authorized me to quote him as
follows on the Rumanian situation:

[Sidenote: Rumania feels bitterness of defeat.]

H.Q.--S.W.F.--Nov. 7.

Rumania is now feeling for the first time the
pressure of war and the bitterness of defeat;
but Rumania must realize that her defeats are
but incidents in the greater campaign; for
behind her stands great Russia, who will see to
it that her brave little ally, who has come
into the war for a just cause, does not
ultimately suffer for daring to espouse this
cause for which we are all fighting. I can
speak with authority when I state that, from
the Emperor down to the common soldier, there
is a united sentiment in Russia that Rumania
shall be protected, helped, and supported in
every way possible. Rumanians must feel faith
in Russia and the Russian people, and must also
know that in the efforts we are making to save
them sentiment is the dominant factor, and we
are not doing it merely as a question of
protecting our own selfish interest and our
left flank.

[Sidenote: No wanton breach of faith.]

It seems to me that the evidence I have submitted above clears the
Allies, including Russia, of any wanton breach of faith toward Rumania,
though the failure of their intention to relieve her certainly does not
diminish their responsibility toward her in the future.

[Sidenote: Germans on defensive in the north.]

In the final analysis the determining factor in the ruin of Rumania was
the failure of the Allies to foresee the number of troops the Germans
could send against them. Their reasoning up to a certain point was
accurate. In July, August, and for part of September it