sra and Awaz, and
could elect to strike the divided British forces either by coming down
the Tigris River to Basra, or by going overland to Awaz. Reinforcements
were sent from India, and Amara occupied. The oil fields seemed secure.
Then the unexpected happened. A Turkish army came down the
Shat-el-Hai--an ancient canal or waterway connecting the Tigris River at
Kut-el-Amara with the Euphrates at Nasiriyeh (or Nasdi)--about 100 miles
to the west of Basra--and threatened the latter place. (Shat-el-Hai
means the river which flows by the village of Hai. Kut-el-Amara means
the fort of Amara and is not to be confused with the town of Amara lower
down the Tigris River.) This led to the British driving the Turks out of
Nasiriyeh and also advancing up the Tigris River from Amara to occupy
Kut-el-Amara, where a battle was fought. The Turks were strongly
entrenched and expected to hold up the Anglo-Indian troops here, but a
turning movement made them retire on Bagdad--about 100 miles to the
northwest. It was known that large Turkish reinforcements were on the
way to Bagdad and an attempt was made to anticipate them.

[Sidenote: General Townshend's attempt to take Bagdad.]

General Townshend advanced on Bagdad with less than a division of mixed
Anglo-Indian troops--some 16,000 to 20,000 strong. At Ctesiphon he found
a Turkish army of four divisions, with two others in reserve, awaiting
him. After a two days' indecisive battle, Townshend, recognizing he had
insufficient forces, retired on his forward base at Kut-el-Amara. The
Arabs in the neighborhood awaited the issue of the battle, ready to take
sides, for the time being, with the winner.

[Sidenote: The Turks much stronger in numbers.]

[Sidenote: Secret of European success in Asia.]

It says much for the stamina of this composite division that, although
opposed throughout by five or six times their number of Turks and
Turkish irregulars, the latter were unable to overwhelm them. To the
Western mind, unacquainted with the mentality and moral weakness of the
Moslem under certain circumstances, this may appear a most foolhardy
adventure. To the Anglo-Indian the most obvious thing to do when in a
tight corner is to go for the enemy no matter what their numbers. All
Europeans in India develop an extraordinary pride in race, and an
inherent contempt for numbers. It is the secret of their success there.
Most Moslems fight well when posted behind strong natural defenses. In
open c