ddle of July it was clear to
us, who were on the fighting line in Volhynia, that the Germans were
having extraordinary difficulties in filling their losses from day to
day. In June their first supports came by army corps; in July they were
coming by divisions; and early in August we checked the arrival of
single regiments, while the Austrians were often so hard pressed that
they sent isolated battalions to fill the holes in their lines.

[Sidenote: Teuton losses.]

In the meantime the Russians had cleared the Bukovina of the enemy. It
was believed that Rumania could put in the field twenty-two divisions of
excellent troops. The enemy losses in prisoners alone, up to the first
of September, from Brussiloff's offensive, were above four hundred
thousand and over four hundred guns. It seemed then that these extra
twenty-two divisions thrown in by Rumania could meet but little
resistance.

[Sidenote: The Allied plan of operation.]

[Sidenote: Munitions to come daily from Russia.]

In order that the Rumanian attempt to cooperate might be safeguarded in
the highest degree, a coordinated plan of operations on the part of the
Allies was agreed upon with Rumania. The allied force in Saloniki under
General Sarrail was to commence a heavy offensive intended to pin down
the Bulgarian and Turkish forces to the southern line, thus protecting
the Rumanian line of the Danube. Brussiloff's left flank in Galicia was
to start a drive through the Bukovina toward the Hungarian plain, thus
relieving the Rumanians from any pressure on the south. A Russian force
of fifty thousand men in the Dobrudja was to protect the Rumanian left.
This, in view of the apparent shortage of enemy reserves, seemed to
protect the army of Rumania on both flanks in its advance into
Transylvania. In addition Rumania was to receive certain shipments of
munitions of war daily from Russia. It was the opinion of the military
advisers in Rumania that under no circumstances could the Germans divert
against her within three months more than sixteen divisions, while some
of the experts advising her placed the number as low as ten.

[Sidenote: Bulgar and Austrian attack.]

[Sidenote: Rumanians on defensive.]

Now let us see what happened. For some reason, which I do not know, the
offensive on the south was delayed, and when it did start it attained no
important results nor did it detain sufficient enemy troops in that
vicinity to relieve Rumania. On the contrary, he