or many of the customs of the world. Now I conceive,
that the dereliction of prejudice against man is as necessary, as a
first measure, to the production of benevolence towards him, as the
dereliction of vice towards the production of virtue. We see then their
minds free from bias on this subject. But what is there on the other
side to operate actively towards the promotion of this trait? They view
man, in the first place, as the temple in which the Divinity may reside.
This procures him respect. Secondly, as a being for whose spiritual
welfare they ought to be solicitous. This produces a concern for him.
And thirdly, as a brother. This produces relationship. We see then the
ground cleared. We see all noxious weeds extirpated. We see good seed
sown in their places; that is, we see prejudices removed from the heart,
and we see the ideas of respect, concern, and relationship implanted in
it. Now it is impossible that these ideas, under these circumstances,
should not as naturally and immediately produce a general benevolence to
man, as common seeds, when all obstructive weeds are removed, should
produce their corresponding saplings or flowers.

How again are these customs and principles of the Quakers promotive of
independence of mind? I answer thus: There is a natural independence of
mind in man, but it is often broken and weakened. Some men injure it by
the solicitation and acceptance of honours, and pensions, and places;
others by flattery and falsehood; others by customs of obeisance; others
by their obedience to fashion. But the independence of mind of the
Quakers is not stunted in its growth by the chiding blasts of such
circumstances and habits. It is invigorated, on the other hand, by their
own laws. No servility is allowed either in word or gesture. Neither
that which is written, nor that which is uttered, is to please the
vanity of the persons addressed, or to imply services never intended to
be performed. The knee is not to be bent to any one. It is strengthened
again and made to shoot by their own maxims. Is it possible to be in the
habit of viewing all men as equal in privileges, and no one as superior
to another but by his virtue, and not to feel a disposition that must
support it? Can the maxim of never doing evil that good may come, when
called into exercise, do otherwise than cherish it? And can reasoning
upon principle have any other effect than that of being promotive of
its growth?

These then are th