the sympathy which belongs to our nature,
and the divine law of doing as we would be done by, which will hold as
far as we can enter into the perceptions either of man or brutes, impose
upon us the duty of anticipating their feelings, and of treating them in
a corresponding or tender manner.

If we take a view of other customs, into which the Quakers have thought
it right to introduce regulations with a view of keeping their members
pure and innocent, we learn other lessons of usefulness. Thus, for
example, the reader, if he does not choose to adopt their dress, may
obtain desirable knowledge upon this subject. He will see that the two
great objects of dress are decency and comfort. He will see, though
Christianity prescribes neither colour nor shape for the clothing, that
it is not indifferent about it. It enjoins simplicity and plainness,
because, where men pay an undue attention to the exterior, they are in
danger of injuring the dignity of their minds. It discards ornaments
from the use of apparel, because these, by puffing up the creature, may
be productive of vanity and pride. It forbids all unreasonable changes
on the plea of conformity with fashion, because the following of fashion
begets a worldly spirit, and because, in proportion as men indulge this
spirit, they are found to follow the loose and changeable morality of
the world, instead of the strict and steady morality of the Gospel.

On the subject of language, though the reader may be unwilling to adopt
all the singularities of the Quakers, he may collect a lesson that may
be useful to him in life. He may discover the necessity of abstaining
from all expressions of flattery, because the use of these may be
morally injurious to himself by abridging the independence of his mind,
and by promoting superstition; while it may be injurious to others, by
occasioning them to think more highly of themselves than they ought, and
more degradingly of their fellow-creatures. He may discover also the
necessity of adhering to the truth in all expressions, whether in his
conversation or in his letters; that there is always a consistency in
truth, and an inconsistency in falsehood; that as expressions accord
with the essences, qualities, properties and characters of things, they
are more or less proper; and that an attempt to adhere to the truth is
productive of moral good, while a departure from it may lead into error,
independently of its injury as a moral evil.

With r