er the Constitution, I do not propose at
present to enter upon its discussion.

The uniform practice from the beginning of the Government, as
established by every President who has exercised the office, and the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have settled the
question in favor of the power of the President to remove all officers
excepting a class holding appointments of a judicial character. No
practice nor any decision has ever excepted a Secretary of War from this
general power of the President to make removals from office.

It is only necessary, then, that I should refer to the power of the
Executive, under the laws of the United States, to remove from office a
Secretary of War. The resolution denies that under these laws this power
has any existence. In other words, it affirms that no such authority is
recognized or given by the statutes of the country.

What, then, are the laws of the United States which deny the President
the power to remove that officer? I know but two laws which bear upon
this question. The first in order of time is the act of August 7, 1789,
creating the Department of War, which, after providing for a Secretary
as its principal officer, proceeds as follows:

SEC. 2. _And be it further enacted_, That there shall be in the said
Department an inferior officer, to be appointed by the said principal
officer, to be employed therein as he shall deem proper, and to be
called the chief clerk in the Department of War, and who, whenever the
said principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of
the United States, or in any other case of vacancy, shall during such
vacancy have the charge and custody of all records, books, and papers
appertaining to the said Department.

It is clear that this act, passed by a Congress many of whose members
participated in the formation of the Constitution, so far from denying
the power of the President to remove the Secretary of War, recognizes
it as existing in the Executive alone, without the concurrence of the
Senate or of any other department of the Government. Furthermore, this
act does not purport to confer the power by legislative authority, nor
in fact was there any other existing legislation through which it was
bestowed upon the Executive. The recognition of the power by this act is
therefore complete as a recognition under the Constitution itself, for
there was no other source or authority from which it c