ned from giving
it any aid or countenance. I therefore conclude that the true meaning of
the joint resolution is that no State a _portion_ of whose inhabitants
were engaged in the rebellion shall be permitted to participate in the
Presidential election, except upon the terms and conditions therein
prescribed.

Assuming this to be the true construction of the resolution, the
inquiry becomes pertinent, May those Northern States a portion of
whose inhabitants were actually in the rebellion be prevented, at the
discretion of Congress, from having their electoral votes counted? It is
well known that a portion of the inhabitants of New York and a portion
of the inhabitants of Virginia were alike engaged in the rebellion; yet
it is equally well known that Virginia, as well as New York, was at all
times during the war recognized by the Federal Government as a State
in the Union--so clearly that upon the termination of hostilities it
was not even deemed necessary for her restoration that a provisional
governor should be appointed; yet, according to this joint resolution,
the people of Virginia, unless they comply with the terms it prescribes,
are denied the right of voting for President, while the people of
New York, a portion of the inhabitants of which State were also in
rebellion, are permitted to have their electoral votes counted without
undergoing the process of reconstruction prescribed for Virginia. New
York is no more a State than Virginia; the one is as much entitled to
representation in the electoral college as the other. If Congress has
the power to deprive Virginia of this right, it can exercise the same
authority with respect to New York or any other of the States. Thus the
result of the Presidential election may be controlled and determined
by Congress, and the people be deprived of their right under the
Constitution to choose a President and Vice-President of the United
States.

If Congress were to provide by law that the votes of none of the States
should be received and counted if cast for a candidate who differed in
political sentiment with a majority of the two Houses, such legislation
would at once be condemned by the country as an unconstitutional and
revolutionary usurpation of power. It would, however, be exceedingly
difficult to find in the Constitution any more authority for the passage
of the joint resolution under consideration than for an enactment
looking directly to the rejection of all votes not