al statesmanship of
Great Britain perhaps saw more clearly the significance of what was taking
place than did that of America itself, and it was prepared to reckon with
this new condition. Moreover, the European commotion resulting from the
French Revolution had brought to the front a new set of interests and
anxieties, for the free handling of which a settlement of differences with
the United States might be advantageous. The effect of such considerations
was at least to render the situation more manageable than might have been
expected, and Jay improved his opportunities with admirable tact.
In pursuance of his principle of bringing "good-natured wisdom" to bear,
Jay suggested to Lord Grenville, the British Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, that they should dispense with written communications, and merely
meet and converse informally "until there should appear a probability
of coming to some amicable mutual understanding." Even after such
understanding should be put into writing, it was not to be regarded as
official or binding, but simply as an exchange of private memoranda. So
strictly was this informal method adhered to that the regular force of
secretaries and copyists had nothing to do with the proceedings until the
treaty was almost ready for signing. Jay had been instructed to demand
compensation for some three thousand slaves who had followed the British
troops when they departed, but Lord Grenville stood firm on the principle
that the slave, once under the British flag, became a free man, the
property rights of the former owner thereupon becoming extinct and not
forming a subject for compensation. Jay, who really held the same opinion,
had to yield the point. It was agreed that the western posts should be
evacuated by June 1, 1796, an arrangement which would allow the British
government to retain them about two years longer. That government had
already justified its retention of these posts by averring that the United
States had not complied with the articles of the peace treaty relating to
British debts. Jay was not in a position to argue the point with any
force, for when he was Secretary of Foreign Affairs he had advised
Congress that these articles "have been constantly violated on our part by
legislative acts, then and still existing and operating"; and that Great
Britain was therefore not to blame for retaining the posts. The British
government was undoubtedly cognizant of this report, and Jay could not
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