And as to know his works and actions, is not yet rightly to know the
Gospel, (for thereby we know not as yet that he hath overcome sin
death and the Devil); even so likewise, it is not as yet to know the
Gospel, when we know such doctrine and commandments, but when the
voice soundeth, which saith, Christ is thine own with life, with
doctrine, with works, death, resurrection, and with all that he hath,
doth and may do.

Most true.

Ib. p. 205.

The ancient Fathers said: 'Distingue tempora et concordabis
Scripturas'; distinguish the times; then may we easily reconcile the
Scriptures together.

Yea! and not only so, but we shall reconcile truths, that seem to repeal
this or that passage of Scripture, with the Scriptures. For Christ is
with his Church even to the end.

Ib.

I verily believe, (said Luther) it (the abolition of the Law) vexed to
the heart the beloved St. Paul himself before his conversion.

How dearly Martin Luther loved St. Paul! How dearly would St. Paul have
loved Martin Luther! And how impossible, that either should not have
done so!

Ib.

In this case, touching the distinguishing the Law from the Gospel, we
must utterly expel all human and natural wisdom, reason, and
understanding.

All reason is above nature. Therefore by reason in Luther, or rather in
his translator, you must understand the reasoning faculty:--that is,
the logical intellect, or the intellectual understanding. For the
understanding is in all respects a medial and mediate faculty, and has
therefore two extremities or poles, the sensual, in which form it is St.
Paul's [Greek: phronaema sarkos]; and the intellectual pole, or the
hemisphere (as it were) turned towards the reason. Now the reason ('lux
idealis seu spiritualis') shines down into the understanding, which
recognizes the light, 'id est, lumen a luce spirituali quasi alienigenum
aliquid', which it can only comprehend or describe to itself by
attributes opposite to its own essential properties. Now these latter
being contingency, and (for though the immediate objects of the
understanding are 'genera et species', still they are particular 'genera
et species') particularity, it distinguishes the formal light ('lumen')
(not the substantial light, 'lux') of reason by the attributes of the
necessary and the universal; and by irradiation of this 'lumen' or
'shine' the understanding becomes a conclusive or logical faculty. As
such it is [Gr