ties, when accompanied with
proper means, are generally able to succeed by force: for victory is
always owing to a superiority in some advantageous circumstances; so
that it seems that force never prevails but in consequence of great
abilities. But still the dispute concerning the justice of it remains;
for some persons think, that justice consists in benevolence, others
think it just that the powerful should govern: in the midst of these
contrary opinions, there are no reasons sufficient to convince us, that
the right of being master and governor ought not to be placed with those
who have the greatest abilities. Some persons, entirely resting upon the
right which the law gives (for that which is legal is in some respects
just), insist upon it that slavery occasioned by war is just, not that
they say it is wholly so, for it may happen that the principle upon
which the wars were commenced is unjust; moreover no one will say that a
man who is unworthily in slavery is therefore a slave; for if so, men of
the noblest families might happen to be slaves, and the descendants of
slaves, if they should chance to be taken prisoners in war and sold: to
avoid this difficulty they say that such persons should not be called
slaves, but barbarians only should; but when they say this, they do
nothing more than inquire who is a slave by nature, which was what we
at first said; for we must acknowledge that there are some persons
who, wherever they are, must necessarily be slaves, but others in no
situation; thus also it is with those of noble descent: it is not only
in their own country that they are Esteemed as such, but everywhere,
but the barbarians are respected on this account at home only; as if
nobility and freedom were of two sorts, the one universal, the other not
so. Thus says the Helen of Theodectes:

"Who dares reproach me with the name of slave? When from the
immortal gods, on either side, I draw my lineage."

Those who express sentiments like these, shew only that they distinguish
the slave and the freeman, the noble and the ignoble from each other
by their virtues and their [1255b] vices; for they think it reasonable,
that as a man begets a man, and a beast a beast, so from a good man, a
good man should be descended; and this is what nature desires to do, but
frequently cannot accomplish it. It is evident then that this doubt
has some reason in it, and that these persons are not slaves, and those
freemen, by the appoint