reason is the architect;
while others want only that portion of it which may be sufficient for
their station; from whence it is evident, that although moral virtue is
common to all those we have spoken of, yet the temperance of a man and
a woman are not the same, nor their courage, nor their justice, though
Socrates thought otherwise; for the courage of the man consists in
commanding, the woman's in obeying; and the same is true in other
particulars: and this will be evident to those who will examine
different virtues separately; for those who use general terms deceive
themselves when they say, that virtue consists in a good disposition of
mind, or doing what is right, or something of this sort. They do much
better who enumerate the different virtues as Georgias did, than those
who thus define them; and as Sophocles speaks of a woman, we think
of all persons, that their 'virtues should be applicable to their
characters, for says he,

"Silence is a woman's ornament,"

but it is not a man's; and as a child is incomplete, it is evident that
his virtue is not to be referred to himself in his present situation,
but to that in which he will be complete, and his preceptor. In like
manner the virtue of a slave is to be referred to his master; for we
laid it down as a maxim, that the use of a slave was to employ him in
what you wanted; so that it is clear enough that few virtues are wanted
in his station, only that he may not neglect his work through idleness
or fear: some person may question if what I have said is true, whether
virtue is not necessary for artificers in their calling, for they often
through idleness neglect their work, but the difference between them
is very great; for a slave is connected with you for life, but the
artificer not so nearly: as near therefore as the artificer approaches
to the situation of a slave, just so much ought he to have of the
virtues of one; for a mean artificer is to a certain point a slave; but
then a slave is one of those things which are by nature what they are,
but this is not true [1260b] of a shoemaker, or any other artist. It is
evident then that a slave ought to be trained to those virtues which are
proper for his situation by his master; and not by him who has the power
of a master, to teach him any particular art. Those therefore are in the
wrong who would deprive slaves of reason, and say that they have only to
follow their orders; for slaves want more instruction than ch