ly enjoy it. But it seems unlikely that man should be able to
adjust that which the law cannot determine; it may be replied, that the
law having laid down the best rules possible, leaves the adjustment and
application of particulars to the discretion of the magistrate; besides,
it allows anything to be altered which experience proves may be better
established. Moreover, he who would place the supreme power in mind,
would place it in God and the laws; but he who entrusts man with it,
gives it to a wild beast, for such his appetites sometimes make him; for
passion influences those who are in power, even the very best of men:
for which reason law is reason without desire.

The instance taken from the arts seems fallacious: wherein it is said to
be wrong for a sick person to apply for a remedy to books, but that it
would be far more eligible to employ those who are skilful in physic;
for these do nothing contrary to reason from motives of friendship
but earn their money by curing the sick, whereas those who have the
management of public affairs do many things through hatred or favour.
And, as a proof of what we have advanced, it may be observed, that
whenever a sick person suspects that his physician has been persuaded by
his enemies to be guilty of any foul practice to him in his profession,
he then rather chooses to apply to books for his cure: and not only this
[1287b] but even physicians themselves when they are ill call in other
physicians: and those who teach others the gymnastic exercises,
exercise with those of the same profession, as being incapable from
self-partiality to form a proper judgment of what concerns themselves.
From whence it is evident, that those who seek for what is just, seek
for a mean; now law is a mean. Moreover; the moral law is far superior
and conversant with far superior objects than the written law; for the
supreme magistrate is safer to be trusted to than the one, though he is
inferior to the other. But as it is impossible that one person should
have an eye to everything himself, it will be necessary that the supreme
magistrate should employ several subordinate ones under him; why then
should not this be done at first, instead of appointing one person in
this manner? Besides, if, according to what has been already said, the
man of worth is on that account fit to govern, two men of worth are
certainly better than one: as, for instance, in Homer, "Let two together
go:" and also Agamemnon's wi