from
supposing that those who are unequal in one thing are unequal in all;
that when men are so in point of fortune, that inequality extends to
everything else. Hence it follows, that those who in some respects are
equal with others think it right to endeavour to partake of an equality
with them in everything; and those who are superior to others endeavour
to get still more; and it is this more which is the inequality: thus
most states, though they have some notion of what is just, yet are
almost totally wrong; and, upon this account, when either party has not
that share in the administration which answers to his expectations, he
becomes seditious: but those who of all others have the greatest right
to be so are the last that are; namely, those who excel in virtue;
for they alone can be called generally superior. There are, too, some
persons of distinguished families who, because they are so, disdain to
be on an equality with others, for those esteem themselves noble who
boast of their ancestors' merit and fortune: these, to speak truth, are
the origin and fountain from whence seditions arise. The alterations
which men may propose to make in governments are two; for either they
may change the state already established into some other, as when
they propose to erect an oligarchy where there is a democracy; or a
democracy, or free state, where there is an oligarchy, or an aristocracy
from these, or those from that; or else, when they have no objection
to the established government, which they like very well, but choose to
have the sole management in it themselves; either in the hands of a few
or one only. They will also raise commotions concerning the degree in
which they would have the established power; as if, for instance, the
government is an oligarchy, to have it more purely so, and in the same
manner if it is a democracy, or else to have it less so; and, in like
manner, whatever may be the nature of the government, either to extend
or contract its powers; or else to make some alterations in some parts
of it; as to establish or abolish a particular magistracy, as some
persons say Lysander endeavoured to abolish the kingly power in Sparta;
and Pausanias that of the ephori. Thus in Epidamnus there was an
alteration in one part of the constitution, for instead of the philarchi
they established a senate. It is also necessary for all the magistrates
at Athens; to attend in the court of the Helisea when any new magistrate
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