n herself, and often consists in voluntary gifts? We must go to
her, trampling what is merely useful under our feet: whithersoever she
may call us or send us we must go, without any regard for our private
fortunes, sometimes without sparing even our own blood, nor must we
ever refuse to obey any of her commands. "What shall I gain," says my
opponent, "if I do this bravely and gratefully?" You will gain the doing
of it--the deed itself is your gain. Nothing beyond this is promised. If
any advantage chances to accrue to you, count it as something extra.
The reward of honourable dealings lies in themselves. If honour is to be
sought after for itself, since a benefit is honourable, it follows that
because both of these are of the same nature, their conditions must also
be the same. Now it has frequently and satisfactorily been proved, that
honour ought to be sought after for itself alone.

II. In this part of the subject we oppose the Epicureans, an effeminate
and dreamy sect who philosophize in their own paradise, amongst whom
virtue is the handmaid of pleasures, obeys them, is subject to them,
and regards them as superior to itself. You say, "there is no pleasure
without virtue." But wherefore is it superior to virtue? Do you imagine
that the matter in dispute between them is merely one of precedence?
Nay, it is virtue itself and its powers which are in question. It cannot
be virtue if it can follow; the place of virtue is first, she ought to
lead, to command, to stand in the highest rank; you bid her look for a
cue to follow. "What," asks our opponent, "does that matter to you? I
also declare that happiness is impossible without virtue. Without virtue
I disapprove of and condemn the very pleasures which I pursue, and to
which I have surrendered myself. The only matter in dispute is this,
whether virtue be the cause of the highest good, or whether it be itself
the highest good." Do you suppose, though this be the only point in
question, that it is a mere matter of precedence? It is a confusion and
obvious blindness to prefer the last to the first. I am not angry at
virtue being placed below pleasure, but at her being mixed up at all
with pleasure, which she despises, whose enemy she is, and from which
she separates herself as far as possible, being more at home with labour
and sorrow, which are manly troubles, than with your womanish good
things.

III. It was necessary to insert this argument, my Liberalis, because
it is