concerning the relation between liberty and necessity.
Section IV. The views of Locke, Tucker, Hartley, Priestley,
Helvetius, and Diderot, with respect to the relation between liberty
and necessity.
Section V. The manner in which Leibnitz endeavours to reconcile
liberty and necessity.
Section VI. The attempt of Edwards to establish free and accountable
agency on the basis of necessity--The views of the younger Edwards,
Day, Chalmers, Dick, D'Aubigne, Hill, Shaw, and M'Cosh, concerning
the agreement of liberty and necessity.
Section VII. The sentiments of Hume, Brown, Comte, and Mill, in
relation to the antagonism between liberty and necessity.
Section VIII. The views of Kant and Sir William Hamilton in relation
to the antagonism between liberty and necessity.
Section IX. The notion of Lord Kames and Sir James Mackintosh on the
same subject.
Section X. The conclusion of Moehler, Tholuck, and others, that all
speculation on such a subject must be vain and fruitless.
Section XI. The true conclusion from the foregoing review of
opinions and arguments.
Chapter II. The Scheme Of Necessity Makes God The Author Of Sin.
Section I. The attempts of Calvin and other reformers to show that
the system of necessity does not make God the author of sin.
Section II. The attempt of Leibnitz to show that the scheme of
necessity does not make God the author of sin.
Section III. The maxims adopted and employed by Edwards to show that
the scheme of necessity does not make God the author of sin.
Section IV. The attempts of Dr. Emmons and Dr. Chalmers to reconcile
the scheme of necessity with the purity of God.
Chapter III. Scheme Of Necessity Denies The Reality Of Moral
Distinctions.
Section I. The views of Spinoza in relation to the reality of moral
distinctions.
Section II. The attempt of Edwards to reconcile the scheme of
necessity with the reality of moral distinctions.
Section III. Of the proposition that "The essence of the virtue and
vice of dispositions of the heart and acts of the will, lies not in
their cause, but in their nature."
Section IV. The scheme of necessity seems to be inconsistent with
the reality of moral distinctions, not because we confound natural
and moral necessity, but because it is rea