lace, it is
interesting to examine how the erroneous teachings of astrology were
gradually abandoned, to note the way in which various orders of mind
rejected these false doctrines or struggled to retain them, and to
perceive how, with a large proportion of even the most civilised races,
the superstitions of judicial astrology were long retained, or are
retained even to this very day. The world has still to see some
superstitions destroyed which are as widely received as astrology ever
was, and which will probably retain their influence over many minds long
after the reasoning portion of the community have rejected them.

Even so far back as the time of Eudoxus the pretensions of astrologers
were rejected, as Cicero informs us ('De Div.' ii. 42). And though the
Romans were strangely superstitious in such matters, Cicero reasons with
excellent judgment against the belief in astrology. Gassendi quotes the
argument drawn by Cicero against astrology, from the predictions of the
Chaldaeans that Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey would die 'in a full old age,
in their own houses, in peace and honour,' whose deaths, nevertheless,
were 'violent, immature, and tragical.' Cicero also used an argument
whose full force has only been recognised in modern times. 'What
contagion,' he asked, 'can reach us from the planets, whose distance is
almost infinite?' It is singular that Seneca, who was well acquainted
with the uniform character of the planetary motions, seems to have
entertained no doubt respecting their influence. Tacitus expresses some
doubts, but was on the whole inclined to believe in astrology.
'Certainly,' he says, 'the majority of mankind cannot be weaned from the
opinion that at the birth of each man his future destiny is fixed;
though some things may fall out differently from the predictions, by the
ignorance of those who profess the art; and thus the art is unjustly
blamed, confirmed as it is by noted examples in all ages.'[1]

Probably, the doubt suggested by the different fortunes and characters
of men born at the same time must have occurred to many before Cicero
dwelt upon it. Pliny, who followed Cicero in this, does not employ the
argument quite correctly, for he says that, 'in every hour, in every
part of the world, are born lords and slaves, kings and beggars.' But of
course, according to astrological principles, it would be necessary that
two persons, whose fortunes were to be alike, should be born, not only
in the