people, had been for many years contending with all their might for
certain ends, and in keenest hostility to the Southern whites. They had
fought for the Union and freedom; the South had fought for the
Confederacy and slavery. By sheer overpowering physical force the
Southern armies had been beaten down, and peace restored, and in name at
least the national authority re-established. But by conviction, habit,
instinct, these opponents yet hot from the battle-field would scrutinize
with jealous care the real success of their principles and the
disposition of their late foes.

The President's policy, as laid down in his message, was at once
challenged in Congress. Stevens opened the debate in the House, and,
without directly assailing the President, antagonized his theory that
the States, like the Union, were indestructible, that secession had only
temporarily suspended their relation, and that they now by right
recurred at once to their normal position. Against this Stevens
maintained that by their rebellion these States had, as organizations,
committed suicide, that they now were in the position of conquered
territory, and that out of this territory Congress was to create new
States on whatever terms it judged most expedient. The President's
theory found an able supporter in Henry J. Raymond, who had just
exchanged the editorship of the New York _Times_ for a seat in Congress.
But he had only a single ally among his Republican colleagues, and the
lonely couple, with four Republican senators, proved to be the only
habitual supporters of the President in the party that had elected him.
But the Democrats came to his side with an alacrity that strengthened
the Republican opposition. Their party had as a whole leaned toward the
South during the war, and they now welcomed the easy terms held out by
the President to their old associates. The Republican doctrine was best
formulated by Shellabarger of Ohio, who, without going to the full
length of Stevens's theory, maintained the essential right of Congress
to lay down the conditions on which the seceded States could resume
their old relation with the Federal Government. That seemed the just and
inevitable logic of the situation; and it was expressed in as much
conformity with the Constitution as was practicable after the rude
jostle of a four years' war.

Meantime, Republican leaders in the Senate--Sumner, Wilson and
Fessenden--were announcing the same doctrine, and were ear