t in the way of doing, or conducting in any respect, as he
wills. (I say not only doing, but conducting; because a voluntary
forbearing to do, sitting still, keeping silence, etc., are instances
of persons' conduct, about which liberty is exercised; tho they are
not so properly called doing.) And the contrary to Liberty, whatever
name we call that by, is a person's being hindered or unable to
conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise.

[Footnote 15: From "The Freedom of the Will." It is not alone as a
contribution to theology that this work has been much admired. It is
probably the most famous theological treatise yet produced in America;
one writer has called it "one of the most famous philosophical works
in the world." But as an intellectual achievement solely, and for the
perfection of its style, it has been quite as generally praised.]

If this which I have mentioned be the meaning of the word liberty, in
the ordinary use of language; as I trust that none that has ever
learned to talk, and is unprejudiced, will deny: then it will follow
that in propriety of speech neither liberty, nor its contrary, can
properly be ascribed to any being or thing but that which has such a
faculty, power or property as is called will. For that which is
possest of no such thing as will, can not have any power or
opportunity of doing according to its will, nor be necessitated to act
contrary to its will, nor be restrained from acting agreeably to it.
And therefore to talk of liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the
very will itself is not to speak good sense; if we judge of sense and
nonsense by the original and proper signification of words. For the
will itself is not an agent that has a will: the power of choosing
itself has not a power of choosing. That which has the power of
volition or choice is the man or the soul, and not the power of
volition itself. And he that has the liberty of doing according to his
will, is the agent or doer who is possest of the will; and not the
will which he is possest of. We say with propriety that a bird let
loose has power and liberty to fly; but not that the bird's power of
flying has a power and liberty of flying. To be free is the property
of an agent, who is possest of powers and faculties, as much as to be
cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous. But these qualities are the
properties of men or persons and not the properties of properties.

There are two things that are cont