son of
American governments with that of Geneva, that the latter is
founded on false principles; that the judicial power, in civil as
well as criminal cases, the executive power wholly, and two thirds
of the legislative power being lodged in two bodies which are
almost self-made, and the members of which are chosen for life,--it
is hardly possible but that this formidable aristocracy should,
sooner or later, destroy the equilibrium which it was supposed
could be maintained at Geneva."

The period from the peace of 1783 to the adoption of the federal
Constitution in 1787 was one of political excitement. The utter failure
of the old Confederation to serve the purposes of national defense and
safety for which it was framed had been painfully felt during the war.
Independence had been achieved under it rather than by it, the patriotic
action of some of the States supplying the deficiencies of others less
able or less willing. By the radical inefficiency of the Confederation
the war had been protracted, its success repeatedly imperiled, and, at
its close, the results gained by it were constantly menaced. The more
perfect union which was the outcome of the deliberations of the federal
convention was therefore joyfully accepted by the people at large.
Indeed, it was popular pressure, and not the arguments of its advocates,
that finally overcame the formidable opposition in and out of the
convention to the Constitution. No written record remains of Mr.
Gallatin's course during the sessions of the federal convention. He was
not a member of the body, nor is his name connected with any public act
having any bearing upon its deliberations. Of the direction of his
influence, however, there can be no doubt. He had an abiding distrust of
strong government,--a dread of the ambitions of men. Precisely what form
he would have substituted for the legislative and executive system
adopted nowhere appears in his writings, but certainly neither president
nor senate would have been included. They bore too close a resemblance
to king and lords to win his approval, no matter how restricted their
powers. He would evidently have leaned to a single house, with a
temporary executive directly appointed by itself; or, if elected by the
people, then for a short term of office, without renewal; and he would
have reduced its legislative powers to the narrowest possible limit. The
best government he held to be that