ion. Secondly, that
a revision by general convention was necessary. Thirdly, that the
legislature should be requested to apply to Congress for that purpose.
The petition recommended twelve amendments, selected from those already
proposed by other States. These were of course restrictive. The report
was made public in the "Pennsylvania Packet" of September 15. With this
the agitation appears to have ceased. On September 13 Congress notified
the States by resolution to appoint electors under the provisions of the
Constitution. The unanimous choice of Washington as president hushed all
opposition, and for a time the Anti-Federalists sunk into
insignificance.

The persistent labors of the friends of revision were not without
result. The amendments proposed by Virginia and New York were laid
before the House of Representatives. Seventeen received the two thirds
vote of the House. After conference with the Senate, in which Mr.
Madison appeared as manager for the House, these, reduced in number to
twelve by elimination and compression, were adopted by the requisite two
thirds vote, and transmitted to the legislatures of the States for
approval. Ratified by a sufficient number of States, they became a part
of the Constitution. They were general, and declaratory of personal
rights, and in no instance restrictive of the power of the general
government.

In 1789, the Assembly of Pennsylvania calling a convention to revise the
Constitution of the State, Mr. Gallatin was sent as a delegate from
Fayette County. To the purposes of this convention he was opposed, as a
dangerous precedent. He had endeavored to organize an opposition to it
in the western counties, by correspondence with his political friends.
His objections were the dangers of alterations in government, and the
absurdity of the idea that the Constitution ever contemplated a change
by the will of a mere majority. Such a doctrine, once admitted, would
enable not only the legislature, but a majority of the more popular
house, were two established, to make another appeal to the people on the
first occasion, and, instead of establishing on solid foundations a new
government, would open the door to perpetual change, and destroy that
stability which is essential to the welfare of a nation; since no
constitution acquires the permanent affection of the people, save in
proportion to its duration and age. Finally, such changes would sooner
or later conclude in an appeal to arms,-