England's intervention. The dispute was complicated
enough. If, as Charles contended, the Treaty of London guaranteed the
_status quo_, Francis, by invading Navarre, was undoubtedly the
offender. But the French King pleaded the Treaty of Noyon, by which
Charles had bound himself to do justice to the exiled King of Navarre,
to marry the French King's daughter, and to pay tribute for Naples.
That treaty was not abrogated by the one concluded in London, yet
Charles had fulfilled none of his promises. Moreover, the Emperor
himself had, long before the invasion of Navarre, been planning a war
with France, and negotiating with Leo to expel the French from Milan,
and to destroy the predominant French faction in Genoa.[411] His (p. 148)
ministers were making little secret of Charles's warlike intentions,
when the Spanish revolt placed irresistible temptation in Francis's
way, and provoked that attack on Navarre, which enabled Charles to
plead, with some colour, that he was not the aggressor. This was the
ground alleged by Henry for siding with Charles, but it was not his
real reason for going to war. Nearly a year before Navarre was
invaded, he had discussed the rupture of Mary's engagement with the
Dauphin and the transference of her hand to the Emperor.

[Footnote 411: In July, 1521, Gattinara drew out
seven reasons for peace and ten for war; the former
he playfully termed the seven deadly sins, and the
latter the ten commandments (_L. and P._, iii.,
1446; _Sp. Cal._, ii., 337).]

The real motives of England's policy do not appear on the surface.
"The aim of the King of England," said Clement VII. in 1524,[412] "is
as incomprehensible as the causes by which he is moved are futile. He
may, perhaps, wish to revenge himself for the slights he has received
from the King of France and from the Scots, or to punish the King of
France for his disparaging language; or, seduced by the flattery of
the Emperor, he may have nothing else in view than to help the
Emperor; or he may, perhaps, really wish to preserve peace in Italy,
and therefore declares himself an enemy of any one who disturbs it. It
is even not impossible that the King of England expects to be rewarded
by the Emperor after the victory, and hopes, perhaps, to get Normandy."
Clement three years before, when Cardinal de Medici, had admitted that
he knew little of English politics