bmarines--the two stationed there at the time, however, were really
not fit for use--would have sufficed for the defense of Manila, and
anything beyond that simply meant an unnecessary sacrifice of forces
which might be far more useful elsewhere.

After our fleet had been divided between the east and the west, both the
Pacific fleet and the reserve Atlantic fleet were individually far
inferior to the Japanese fleet. The maintenance of a fleet in the
Pacific as well as of one in the Atlantic was a fatal luxury. It was
superfluous to keep on tap a whole division of ships in our Atlantic
harbors merely posing as maritime ornaments before the eyes of Europe or
at the most coming in handy for an imposing demonstration against a
refractory South-American Republic. All this could have been done just
as well with a few cruisers. English money and Japanese intrigues, it is
true, succeeded in always keeping the Venezuelan wound open, so that we
were constantly obliged to steal furtive glances at that corner of the
world, one that had caused us so much political vexation. Matters had
indeed reached a sorry pass if our political prestige was so shaky, that
it was made to depend on Mr. Castro's valuation of the forces at the
disposal of the United States!

In consideration of the many unforeseen delays that had occurred in the
work of digging the Panama Canal, there was only one policy for us to
adopt until its completion, and that was to keep our fleet together and
either to concentrate it in the Pacific and thus deter the enemy from
attacking our coasts, regardless of what might be thought of our action
in Tokio, or to keep only a few cruisers in the Pacific, as formerly,
and to concentrate the fleet in the Atlantic, so as to be able to attack
the enemy from the rear with the full force of our naval power. But
these amateur commissioners of the public safety who wished to have an
imposing squadron on view wherever our flag floated--as if the Stars and
Stripes were a signal of distress instead of a token of
strength--condemned our fleet to utter helplessness. In 1908, when
there was no mistaking the danger, we, the American people, one of the
richest and most energetic nations of the world, nevertheless allowed
ourselves in the course of the debate on the naval appropriations to be
frightened by Senator Maine's threat of a deficit of a few dollars in
our budget, should the sums that were absolutely needed in case our
fleet was to