e country dropped the plow, stood their tools in the
corner and laid their pens away; the clattering typewriters became
silent, and in the offices of the sky-scrapers business came to a
stand-still. Only in the factories where war materials were manufactured
did great activity reign.

For the present there was at least one dim hope left, namely the fleet.
But where was the fleet? After our battle-fleet had crossed the Pacific
to Australia and Eastern Asia, it returned to the Atlantic, while a
squadron of twelve battleships and four armored cruisers was sent under
Admiral Perry to the west coast and stationed there, with headquarters
at San Francisco. To these ships must be added the regular Pacific
squadron and Philippine squadron. The remaining ships of our fleet were
in Atlantic waters.

That was the fatal mistake committed in the year of our Lord 1909. In
vain, all in vain, had been the oft-repeated warning that in face of the
menacing Japanese danger the United States navy should be kept together,
either in the west or in the east. Only when concentrated, only in the
condition in which it was taken through the Straits of Magellan by
Admiral Evans, was our fleet absolutely superior to the Japanese. Every
dispersal, every separation of single divisions was bound to prove
fatal. Article upon article and pamphlet upon pamphlet were written
anent the splitting-up of our navy! And yet what a multitude of entirely
different and mutually exclusive tasks were set her at one and the same
time! Manila was to be protected, Pearl Harbor was to have a naval
station, the Pacific coast was to be protected, and there was to be a
reserve fleet off the eastern coast.

And yet it was perfectly clear that any part of the fleet which happened
to be stationed at Manila or Hawaii would be lost to the Americans
immediately on the outbreak of hostilities. But we deluded ourselves
with the idea that Japan would not dare send her ships across the
Pacific in the face of our little Philippine squadron, whereas not even
a large squadron stationed at Manila would have hindered the Japanese
from attacking us. Even such a squadron they could easily have destroyed
with a detachment of equal strength, without in any way hindering their
advance against our western shores, while the idea of attempting to
protect an isolated colony with a few ships against a great sea-power
was perfectly ridiculous. The strong coast fortifications and a division
of su