.S. 226 (1945).

[55] 305 U.S. 32 (1938).

[56] 317 U.S. 287, 298-299 (1942).

[57] Ibid. at p. 302.

[58] 317 U.S. 287, 312, 315, 321 (1942).

[59] 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).

[60] Bell _v._ Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901); Andrews _v._ Andrews, 188 U.S.
14 (1903).

[61] Strong dissents were filed which have influenced subsequent
holdings. Among these was that of Justice Rutledge which attacked both
the consequences of the decision as well as the concept of
jurisdictional domicile on which it was founded.

"Unless 'matrimonial domicil,' banished in _Williams_ I [by the
overruling of Haddock _v._ Haddock], has returned renamed ['domicil of
origin'] in _Williams_ II, every decree becomes vulnerable in every
State. Every divorce, wherever granted, * * *, may now be reexamined by
every other State, upon the same or different evidence, to redetermine
the 'jurisdictional fact,' always the ultimate conclusion of 'domicil.'
* * *

"The Constitution does not mention domicil. Nowhere does it posit the
powers of the states or the nation upon that amorphous, highly variable
common-law conception. * * * No legal conception, save possibly
'jurisdiction,' * * *, affords such possibilities for uncertain
application. * * * Apart from the necessity for travel, [to effect a
change of domicile, the latter], criterion comes down to a purely
subjective mental state, related to remaining for a length of time never
yet defined with clarity. * * * When what must be proved is a variable,
the proof and the conclusion which follows upon it inevitably take on
that character. * * * [The majority have not held] that denial of credit
will be allowed, only if the evidence [as to the place of domicile] is
different or depending in any way upon the character or the weight of
the difference. The test is not different evidence. It is evidence,
whether the same or different and, if different, without regard to the
quality of the difference, from which an opposing set of inferences can
be drawn by the trier of fact 'not unreasonably.' * * * But * * * [the
Court] does not define 'not unreasonably.' It vaguely suggests a
supervisory function, to be exercised when the denial [of credit]
strikes its sensibilities as wrong, by some not stated standard. * * *
There will be no 'weighing' [of evidence], * * * only examination for
sufficiency."--(325 U.S. 226, 248, 251, 255, 258-259 (1945)).

No less disposed to prophesy undesirable results from this decision