proclamation, although a similar procedure had been held
to bring President Johnson's amnesties to the Court's notice.[119] In
1927, however, in sustaining the right of the President to commute a
sentence of death to one of life imprisonment, against the will of the
prisoner, the Court abandoned this view. "A pardon in our days," it
said, "is not a private act of grace from an individual happening to
possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme. When granted
it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the public
welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the judgment
fixed."[120] Whether these words sound the death knell of the acceptance
doctrine is perhaps doubtful.[121] They seem clearly to indicate that by
substantiating a commutation order for a deed of pardon, a President can
always have his way in such matters, provided the substituted penalty is
authorized by law and does not in common understanding exceed the
original penalty.[122]

SCOPE OF THE POWER

The power embraces all "offences against the United States," except
cases of impeachment, and includes the power to remit fines, penalties,
and forfeitures, except as to money covered into the Treasury or paid an
informer;[123] also the power to pardon absolutely or conditionally; and
includes the power to commute sentences, which, as seen above, is
effective without the convict's consent.[124] It has been held,
moreover, in face of earlier English practice, that indefinite
suspension of sentence by a court of the United States is an invasion of
the Presidential prerogative, amounting as it does to a condonation of
the offense.[125] It was early assumed that the power included the power
to pardon specified classes or communities wholesale, in short, the
power to amnesty, which is usually exercised by proclamation. General
amnesties were issued by Washington in 1795, by Adams in 1800, by
Madison in 1815, by Lincoln in 1863, by Johnson in 1865, 1867, and 1868,
and by the first Roosevelt--to Aguinaldo's followers--in 1902.[126] Not,
however, till after the Civil War was the point adjudicated, when it was
decided in favor of Presidential prerogative.[127]

"OFFENSES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES"; CONTEMPT OF COURT

In the first place, such offenses are not offenses against the States.
In the second place, they are completed offenses;[128] the President
cannot pardon by anticipation, otherwise he would be invested with the
p