tured French vessel, and
finding it applicable to the situation before it, set the judgment aside
and ordered the vessel restored to her owners. Since that time the Court
has declared repeatedly in cases in which State law was not involved
that when a treaty prescribes a rule by which private rights are to be
determined, the courts are bound to take judicial notice thereof and to
accept it as a rule of decision in any appropriate proceeding to enforce
such rights.[166] In short, whether a given treaty provision is
self-executing is a question for the Court; although it does not
altogether lack guiding principles in deciding it, the most important of
which is the doctrine of political questions.[167] _See_ pp. 426,
471-472.

CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO TREATIES

From the foregoing two other questions arise: first, are there types of
treaty provisions which only Congress can put into effect? Second,
assuming an affirmative answer to the above question, is Congress under
constitutional obligation to supply such implementation? For such answer
as exists to the first question resort must be had to the record of
practice and nonjudicial opinion. The question arose originally in 1796
in connection with the Jay Treaty, certain provisions of which required
appropriations to carry them into effect. In view of the third clause of
article I, section 9 of the Constitution, which says that "no money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by law; * * *," it was universally agreed that Congress must be
applied to if the treaty provisions alluded to were to be put into
execution. But at this point the second question arose, to the solution
of which the Court has subsequently contributed indirectly. (_See_ pp.
420-421). A bill being introduced into the House of Representatives to
vote the needed funds, supporters of the treaty, Hamilton, Chief Justice
Ellsworth, and others, argued that the House must make the appropriation
willy nilly; that the treaty, having been ratified by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, was "supreme law of the land," and
that the legislative branch was bound thereby no less than the
executive and judicial branches.[168] Madison, a member of the House,
opposed this thesis in a series of resolutions, the nub of which is
comprised in the following statement: "When a Treaty stipulates
regulations on any of the subjects submitted by the Constitu