very well provoke the other
party to the treaty to do so. Hence the question arises of where the
Constitution lodges this power; also the closely related question of
where it lodges the power to interpret the contractual provisions of
treaties. The first case of outright abrogation of a treaty by the
United States occurred in 1798, when Congress, by the act of July 7 of
that year, pronounced the United States freed and exonerated from the
stipulations of the Treaties of 1778 with France.[181] This act was
followed two days later by one authorizing limited hostilities against
the same country; and in the case of Bas _v._ Tingy[182] the Supreme
Court treated the act of abrogation as simply one of a bundle of acts
declaring "public war" upon the French Republic.

TERMINATION OF TREATIES BY NOTICE

The initial precedent in the matter of termination by notice occurred in
1846, when by the Joint Resolution of April 27, Congress authorized the
President at his discretion to notify the British Government of the
abrogation of the Convention of August 6, 1827, relative to the joint
occupation of the Oregon Territory. As the President himself had
requested the resolution, the episode supports the theory that
international conventions to which the United States is party, even
those terminable on notice, are terminable only by act of Congress.[183]
Subsequently Congress has often passed resolutions denouncing treaties
or treaty provisions which by their own terms were terminable on notice,
and Presidents have usually carried out such resolutions, though not
invariably.[184] By the La Follette-Furuseth Seamen's Act, approved
March 4, 1915,[185] President Wilson was directed, "within ninety days
after the passage of the act, to give notice to foreign governments that
so much of any treaties as might be in conflict with the provisions of
the act would terminate on the expiration of the periods of notice
provided for in such treaties," and the required notice was given.[186]
When, however, by section 34 of the Jones Merchant Marine Act of 1920
the same President was authorized and directed within ninety days to
give notice to the other parties to certain treaties, which the act
infracted, of the termination thereof, he refused to comply, asserting
that he "did not deem the direction contained in section 34 * * * an
exercise of any constitutional power possessed by Congress."[187] The
same intransigent attitude was continued by Presi