ris, and played to the Emperors and a parterre of princes the
masterpieces of the French stage, especially those which contained
suitable allusions. A notable incident occurred on the recital of the
line in the "Oedipe" of Voltaire:
"L'amitie d'un grand homme est un bienfait des dieux."
As if moved by a sudden inspiration, Alexander arose and warmly
pressed the hand of Napoleon, who was then half-dozing at his
side.[199] On the surface, indeed, everything was friendship and
harmony. With urbane facility, the Czar accompanied his ally to the
battlefield of Jena, listened to the animated description of the
victor, and then joined in the chase in a forest hard by.
But beneath these brilliant shows there lurked suspicions and fears.
Alexander was annoyed that Napoleon retained French garrisons in the
fortresses on the Oder and claimed an impossible sum as indemnity from
Prussia. This was not the restoration of Prussia's independence, for
which he, Alexander, had pleaded; and while the French eagles were at
Kuestrin, the Russian frontier could not be deemed wholly safe.[200]
Then again the Czar had been secretly warned by Talleyrand against
complaisance to the French Emperor. "Sire, what are you coming here
for? It is for you to save Europe, and you will only succeed in that
by resisting Napoleon. The French are civilized, their sovereign is
not. The sovereign of Russia is civilized, her people are not.
Therefore the sovereign of Russia must be the ally of the French
people."[201] We may doubt whether this symmetrical proposition would
have had much effect, if Alexander had not received similar warnings
from his own ambassador at Paris; and it would seem that too much
importance has been assigned to what is termed Talleyrand's
_treachery_ at Erfurt.[202] Affairs of high policy are determined, not
so much by the logic of words as by the sterner logic of facts. Ever
since Tilsit, Napoleon had been prodigal of promises to his ally, but
of little else. The alluring visions set forth in his letter of
February 2nd were as visionary as ever; and Romantzoff expressed the
wish of his countrymen in his remark to Champagny: "We have come to
Erfurt to set a limit to this conduct." It was evident that if
Napoleon had his way completely, the partition of Turkey would take
place at the time and in the manner desired by him; this the Czar was
determined to prevent, and therefore turned a deaf ear to his ally's
proposal that they sho
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