all State. And
the prevalent opinion found expression in the protests uttered in
Parliament that it would have been better to face the whole might of
the French, Russian, and Danish navies than to emulate the conduct of
those who had overrun and despoiled Switzerland.

Moreover, our action did not benefit Sweden, but just the reverse.
Cathcart's force, that had been helping the Swedes in the defence of
their Pomeranian province, was withdrawn in order to strengthen our
hands against Copenhagen. Thereupon the gallant Gustavus, overborne by
the weight of Marshal Brune's corps, sued for an armistice. It was
granted only on the condition that Stralsund should pass into Brune's
hands (August 20th); and the Swedes, unable even to hold Ruegen, were
forced to give up that island also. Sick in health and weary of a
world that his chivalrous instincts scorned, Gustavus withdrew his
forces into Sweden. Even there he was menaced. The hostilities which
Denmark forthwith commenced against England and Sweden exposed his
southern coasts; but he now chose to lean on the valour of his own
subjects rather than on the broken reed of British assistance, and
awaited the attacks of the Danes on the west and of the Russians on
his province of Finland.

The news from Copenhagen also furnished the Czar with a good excuse
for hostilities with England. For such an event he had hitherto been
by no means desirous. On his return from Tilsit to St. Petersburg he
found the nobility and merchants wholly opposed to a rupture with the
Sea Power, the former disdaining to clasp the hand of the conqueror of
Friedland, the latter foreseeing ruin from the adoption of the
Continental System; and when Napoleon sent Savary on a special mission
to the Czar's Court, the Empress-Mother and nobles alike showed their
abhorrence of "the executioner of the Duc d'Enghien." In vain were
imperial favours lavished on this envoy. He confessed to Napoleon that
only the Czar and the new Foreign Minister, Romantzoff, were
favourable to France; and it was soon obvious that their ardour for a
partition of Turkey must disturb the warily balancing policy which
Napoleon adopted as soon as the Czar's friendship seemed assured.

The dissolution of this artificial alliance was a task far beyond the
powers of British statesmanship. To Alexander's offer of mediation
between France and England Canning replied that we desired first to
know what were "the just and equitable terms on whic