rown in his reserves, the attack
would be broken off, only to begin again elsewhere, and with the same
energy, unexpectedness, and success. British Staff work and British
tactics were at their highest point of excellence, and the spirit of
the men, fanned by that breeze which Victory and Hope bring with them,
were, in the Commander-in-Chief's word, "magnificent."

And so we come to the evening of the 26th of September. Along these
hill-sides, where we stand, on the west side of the Canal du Nord, lay
Sir Julian Byng and the Third Army. To his right, on the south-east,
was General Rawlinson, facing the strongest portion of the Hindenburg
line, with two American divisions, led by Major-General Read, under
his command; while on his left, and to the north, the First Army,
under General Home, held the line along the Canal du Nord, and the
marshes of the Sensee.

The most critical moment in the campaign had arrived. For in the
assault on the Hindenburg line heavy risks had to be run. It is clear,
I think, from the wording of Marshal Haig's dispatch, that in respect
to the attack he took a special responsibility, which was abundantly
vindicated by the event. The British War Cabinet was extremely
anxious; the French Generalissimo was content to leave it to the
British Commander-in-Chief; and Sir Douglas Haig, confident "that the
British attack was the essential part of the general scheme, and that
the moment was favourable," had the decision to make, and made it as
we know. It is evident also from the dispatch that Sir Douglas was
quite aware, not only of the military, but of the political risk. "The
political effects of an unsuccessful attack upon a position so well
known as the Hindenburg line would be large, and would go far to
revive the declining _morale_, not only of the German Army, but of the
German people." This aspect of the matter must, of course, have been
terribly present to the mind of the British War Cabinet.

Moreover, the British Armies had been fighting continuously for nearly
two months, and their losses, though small in proportion to what had
been gained and to the prisoners taken, were still considerable.

Nevertheless, with all these considerations in mind, "_I decided_,"
says General Haig, "_to proceed with the attack_."[6]

[6] The italics are mine.

There lie before me a Memorandum, by an officer of the General Staff,
on the Hindenburg line, drawn up about a month after the capture of
the main