nd it stated that everything possible must be done
to give the artillery "freedom of action _in its main role_, viz., the
engagement of tanks." "Its main role!" The phrase shows that under the
pressure of the tanks, the two chief pillars and axioms of the former
German defence system--"protective barrages" and "immediate
counter-attack"--were giving way, in the case at least of tank
attacks, with, of course, the natural result of confusion and
weakness. After the Battle of Amiens (August 8th) the German Command
issued an explanation of the defeat, signed by Ludendorff. Chief among
the reasons given appears: "The fact that the troops were surprised by
the massed attack of tanks, and lost their heads when the tanks
suddenly appeared behind them, having broken through under cover of
fog and smoke." The Crown Prince's group of armies reports on the same
battle: "That during the present fighting large numbers of tanks broke
through on narrow fronts, and, pushing straight forward, rapidly
attacked battery positions and the headquarters of divisions. In many
cases no defence could be made in time against the tanks, which
attacked them from all sides."

And the peremptory order follows:

"Messages concerning tanks will have priority over all other
messages or calls whatsoever."

Naturally the German Army and the German public had by this time begun
to ask why the German Command was not itself better equipped with
tanks before the opening of the Allied offensive. The answer seems to
be, first of all, that they were originally thought little of, as "a
British idea." "The use of 300 British tanks at Cambrai," says a
German document, "was a 'battle of material.' The German Higher
Command decided from the very outset not to fight a 'battle of
material.'" They preferred instead their habitual policy of "massed
attack"--using thereby in the fighting line a number of inferior men,
"classified as fit for garrison or labour duties," but who, if they
"can carry a rifle, must fight." The German Command were, therefore,
"not in a position to find the labour for the construction of new and
additional material such as tanks." For the initial arrogance,
however, which despised the tanks, and for the system which had
prevented him from building them in time, when their importance was
realised, the enemy was soon plunged in bitter but unavailing regrets.
All he could do was to throw the blame of failure on the Allies' new
weapon, and