, of course, be
control and the responsibility for this control must rest with me." He
points out further that the general policy of the administration had
been outlined in the inaugural, that no action since taken had been
inconsistent with this. The necessary preparations for the defence of
the government were in train and, as the President trusted, were being
energetically pushed forward by the several department heads. "I have a
right," said Lincoln, "to expect loyal co-operation from my associates
in the Cabinet. I need their counsel and the nation needs the best
service that can be secured from our united wisdom." The letter of
Seward was put away and appears never to have been referred to between
the two men. It saw the light only after the President's death. If he
had lived it might possibly have been suppressed altogether. A month
later, Seward said to a friend, "There is in the Cabinet but one vote
and that is cast by the President."

The post next in importance under the existing war conditions was that
of Secretary of War. The first man to hold this post was Simon Cameron
of Pennsylvania. Cameron was very far from being a friend of Lincoln's.
The two men had had no personal relations and what Lincoln knew of him
he liked not at all. The appointment had been made under the pressure of
the Republicans of Pennsylvania, a State whose support was, of course,
all important for the administration. It was not the first nor the last
time that the Republicans of this great State, whose Republicanism seems
to be much safer than its judgment, have committed themselves to
unworthy and undesirable representatives, men who were not fitted to
stand for Pennsylvania and who were neither willing nor able to be of
any service to the country. The appointment of Cameron had, as appears
from the later history, been promised to Pennsylvania by Judge Davis in
return for the support of the Pennsylvania delegation for the nomination
of Lincoln. Lincoln knew nothing of the promise and was able to say with
truth, and to prove, that he had authorised no promises and no
engagements whatsoever. He had, in fact, absolutely prohibited Davis and
the one or two other men who were supposed to have some right to speak
for him in the convention, from the acceptance of any engagements or
obligations whatsoever. Davis made the promise to Pennsylvania on his
own responsibility and at his own risk; Lincoln felt under too much
obligation to Davis for