t Britain. It gave to Palmerston and
Russell, who were at that time in charge of the government, the
opportunity for which they had been looking to place on the side of the
Confederacy the weight of the influence of Great Britain. It
strengthened the hopes of Louis Napoleon for carrying out, in
conjunction with Great Britain, a scheme that he had formulated under
which France was to secure a western empire in Mexico, leaving England
to do what she might find convenient in the adjustment of the affairs of
the so-called United States.

The first report secured from the law officers of the Crown took the
ground that the capture was legal under international law and under the
practice of Great Britain itself. This report was, however, pushed to
one side, and Palmerston drafted a demand for the immediate surrender of
the commissioners. This demand was so worded that a self-respecting
government would have had great difficulty in assenting to it without
risk of forfeiting support with its own citizens. It was in fact
intended to bring about a state of war. Under the wise influence of
Prince Albert, Queen Victoria refused to give her approval to the
document. It was reworded by Albert in such fashion as to give to the
government of the United States an opportunity for adjustment without
loss of dignity. Albert was clear in his mind that Great Britain ought
not to be committed to war for the destruction of the great Republic of
the West and for the establishment of a state of which the corner-stone
was slavery. Fortunately, Victoria was quite prepared to accept in this
matter Albert's judgment. Palmerston protested and threatened
resignation, but finally submitted.

When the news of the capture of the commissioners came to Washington,
Seward for once was in favour of a conservative rather than a truculent
course of action. He advised that the commissioners should be
surrendered at once rather than to leave to Great Britain the
opportunity for making a dictatorial demand. Lincoln admitted the risk
of such demand and the disadvantage of making the surrender under
pressure, but he took the ground that if the United States waited for
the British contention, a certain diplomatic advantage could be gained.
When the demand came, Lincoln was able, with a rewording (not for the
first time) of Seward's despatch, to take the ground that the government
of the United States was "well pleased that Her Majesty's government
should have final