he arrival of the
state militia under Lincoln completed the demoralization of Shays' army.
Retreating through the hilly country of Hampshire, they wore finally
overtaken and routed at Petersham. Some of the insurgents went to their
homes, completely humbled and subdued; others fled across the border to
await better times; and still others, unrepentant and unsubdued,
continued to harass the countryside. It was not until the following
September that Governor Bowdoin ventured to disband the militia.
To these disturbances in Massachusetts, Congress had not remained
indifferent. Aside from the direct interest that all members were bound
to take in a rebellion which seemed to threaten the very foundations of
a sister State and which might easily recur in their own, Congress was
concerned for the fate of the national arsenal at Springfield. But no
forces were available for the protection of the property of the
Confederation. The few hundred men who comprised the army were scattered
in garrisons along the western frontier. Acting as intermediary between
Congress and Governor Bowdoin, General Knox as Secretary of War made
what provision he could for the defense of the arsenal by local militia;
but these measures were confessedly inadequate. Upon his report Congress
was finally moved to increase the army, ostensibly for the protection of
the frontier, where in truth Indian hostilities required the presence of
additional troops. As these forces would be raised chiefly in New
England, they could be employed first to protect Springfield. Any open
avowal of this plan was avoided, however, lest the insurgents should
take alarm and immediately attack the arsenal. But these plans were
wrecked on the reef of financial bankruptcy. Congress could only
supplicate the States for money and borrow what it might on its
expectations. Recruiting went on so slowly that the rebellion was
practically over when two companies of artillery, numbering
seventy-three men each, which had been raised in Massachusetts, were
finally marched to Springfield. All the other recruits were dismissed.
The inefficiency of Congress and its want of moral influence were
self-confessed.
In his famous circular letter of 1783, Washington had spoken of the
times as a period of "political probation." The moment had come for the
United States to determine, said he, "whether they will be respectable
and prosperous, or contemptible and miserable, as a nation." Three years
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