he moral virtues as its end, for prudence is "the right mode of
procedure in our actions;"[417] hence, too, the ends of the moral
virtues are the principles of prudence, as the Philosopher also says in
the same work.[418] In the same way, then, as we said above that in the
case of a man who directs them to the repose of contemplation, the moral
virtues pertain to the contemplative life, so also the knowledge which
is prudence, and which is by its very nature directed to the operations
of the moral virtues, directly pertains to the active life--that is, of
course, on the supposition that prudence is understood in the strict
sense in which the Philosopher speaks of it.

If, however, prudence be understood in a broad sense--namely, as
embracing all kinds of human knowledge--then prudence pertains, at least
in certain of its aspects, to the contemplative life; thus Cicero
says[419]: "The man who can see a truth the most clearly and quickly,
and explain the reason of it, is rightly regarded as most prudent and
most wise."

But some maintain that prudence does not pertain to the active life,
thus:

1. Just as the contemplative life pertains to the cognoscitive powers,
so does the active life pertain to the appetitive powers. But prudence
does not pertain to the appetitive powers but rather to the
cognoscitive. Consequently it does not pertain to the active life.

But moral acts derive their character from the end towards which
they are directed; consequently to the contemplative life
belongs that kind of knowledge which makes its end consist in
the very knowledge of truth. But the knowledge which is
prudence, and which is rather directed to the acts of the
appetitive powers, pertains to the active life.

2. Again, S. Gregory says[420] "The active life, occupied as it is with
works, sees less clearly," and hence is typified by Lia, who was
blear-eyed. But prudence demands clear vision, so that a man may judge
what is to be done. Whence it would seem that prudence does not pertain
to the active life.

But occupation with external things only makes a man see less
clearly those intelligible truths which are not connected with
the things of sense; the external occupations of the active
life, however, make a man see more clearly in his judgment on a
course of action--and this is a question of prudence--for he has
experience, and his mind is attentive: "When you are attentive,"