; there the
same conscience is disregarded. And that kind of a conscience is the
rule of morality; to go against it is to sin.

There are times when we have no certitude. The conscience may have
nothing to say concerning the honesty of a cause to which we are about
to commit ourselves. This state of uncertainty and perplexity is called
doubt. To doubt is to suspend judgment; a dubious conscience is one
that does not function.

In doubt the question may be: "To do; is it right or wrong? May I
perform this act, or must I abstain therefrom?" In this case, we
inquire whether it be lawful or unlawful to go on, but we are sure that
it is lawful not to act. There is but one course to pursue. We must not
commit ourselves and must refrain from acting, until such a time, at
least, as, by inquiring and considering, we shall have obtained
sufficient evidence to convince us that we may allow ourselves this
liberty without incurring guilt. If, on the contrary, while still
doubting, we persist in committing the act, we sin, because in all
affairs of right and wrong we must follow a certain conscience as the
standard of morality.

But the question may be: "To do or not to do; which is right and which
is wrong?" Here we know not which way to turn, fearing evil in either
alternative. We must do one thing or the other. There are reasons and
difficulties on both sides. We are unable to resolve the difficulties,
lay the doubt, and form a sure conscience, what must we do?

If all action can be momentarily suspended, and we have the means of
consulting, we must abstain from action and consult. If the affair is
urgent, and this cannot be done; if we must act on the spot and decide
for ourselves, then, we can make that dubious conscience prudently
certain by applying this principle to our conduct: "Of two evils,
choose the lesser." We therefore judge which action involves the least
amount of evil. We may embrace the course thus chosen without a fear of
doing wrong. If we have inadvertently chosen the greater evil, it is an
error of judgment for which we are in nowise responsible before God.
But this means must be employed only where all other and surer means
fail. The certainty we thereby acquire is a prudent certainty, and is
sufficient to guarantee us against offending.

CHAPTER IV.
LAXITY AND SCRUPLES.

IN every question of conscience there are two opposing factors:
Liberty, which is agreeable to our nature, which allows us to do