dly countries.
Probably the chief difficulty was that the British Foreign Office could
see no logical sequence in the Washington policy. Put Huerta out--yes,
by all means: but what then? Page's notes of his visit to Sir Edward
Grey a few days after the latest Carden interview confirm this:

* * * * *

I have just come from an hour's talk with Grey about Mexico. He showed
me his telegram to Carden, asking about Carden's reported interview
criticizing the United States, and Carden's flat denial. He showed me
another telegram to Carden about Huerta's reported boast that he would
have the backing of London, Paris, and Berlin against the United States,
in which Grey advised Carden that British policy should be to keep aloof
from Huerta's boasts and plans. Carden denied that Huerta made such a
boast in his statement to the Diplomatic Corps. Grey wishes the
President to know of these telegrams.

Talk then became personal and informal. I went over the whole subject
again, telling how the Press and people of the United States were
becoming critical of the British Government; that they regarded the
problem as wholly American; that they resented aid to Huerta, whom they
regarded as a mere tyrant; that they suspected British interests of
giving financial help to Huerta; that many newspapers and persons
refused to believe Carden's denial; that the President's policy was not
academic but was the only policy that would square with American ideals
and that it was unchangeable. I cited our treatment of Cuba. I explained
again that I was talking unofficially and giving him only my own
interpretation of the people's mood. He asked, if the British Government
should withdraw the recognition of Huerta, what would happen.

"In my opinion," I replied, "he would collapse."

"What would happen then--worse chaos?"

"That is impossible," I said. "There is no worse chaos than deputies in
jail, the dictatorial doubling of the tariff, the suppression of
opinion, and the practical banishment of independent men. If Huerta
should fall, there is hope that suppressed men and opinion will set up a
successful government."

"Suppose that fail," he asked--"what then?"

I replied that, in case of continued and utter failure, the United
States might feel obliged to repeat its dealings with Cuba and that the
continued excitement of opinion in the United States might precipitate
this.

Grey protested that he knew nothing