regiments of Lyttelton's
Brigade followed hard at their heels, and before night they had firmly
established themselves upon the hill. But the fatal slowness which had
marred General Buller's previous operations again prevented him from
completing his success. Twice at least in the course of these operations
there is evidence of sudden impulse to drop his tools in the midst of
his task and to do no more for the day. So it was at Colenso, where an
order was given at an early hour for the whole force to retire, and the
guns which might have been covered by infantry fire and withdrawn after
nightfall were abandoned. So it was also at a critical moment at this
action at Vaalkranz. In the original scheme of operations it had been
planned that an adjoining hill, called the Green Hill, which partly
commanded Vaalkranz, should be carried also. The two together made a
complete position, while singly each was a very bad neighbour to the
other. On the aide-de-camp riding up, however, to inquire from General
Buller whether the time had come for this advance, he replied, 'We have
done enough for the day,' and left out this essential portion of his
original scheme, with the result that all miscarried.

Speed was the most essential quality for carrying out his plan
successfully. So it must always be with the attack. The defence does
not know where the blow is coming, and has to distribute men and guns to
cover miles of ground. The attacker knows where he will hit, and behind
a screen of outposts he can mass his force and throw his whole strength
against a mere fraction of that of his enemy. But in order to do so he
must be quick. One tiger spring must tear the centre out of the line
before the flanks can come to its assistance. If time is given, if the
long line can concentrate, if the scattered guns can mass, if lines of
defence can be reduplicated behind, then the one great advantage which
the attack possesses is thrown away. Both at the second and at the third
attempts of Buller the British movements were so slow that had the enemy
been the slowest instead of the most mobile of armies, they could still
always have made any dispositions which they chose. Warren's dawdling
in the first days of the movement which ended at Spion Kop might with an
effort be condoned on account of possible difficulties of supply, but
it would strain the ingenuity of the most charitable critic to find a
sufficient reason for the lethargy of Vaalkranz. Thoug