orm of bullets. The long infantry line extended
yet further and lapped round the flank of the Boer position, and once
more the terrible duet of the Mauser and the Lee-Metford was sung while
the 81st field battery hurried up in time to add its deep roar to their
higher chorus. With fine judgment Cronje held on to the last moment of
safety, and then with a swift movement to the rear seized a further line
two miles off, and again snapped back at his eager pursuers. All day the
grim and weary rearguard stalled off the fiery advance of the infantry,
and at nightfall the wagons were still untaken. The pursuing force to
the north of the river was, it must be remembered, numerically inferior
to the pursued, so that in simply retarding the advance of the enemy and
in giving other British troops time to come up, Knox's brigade was doing
splendid work. Had Cronje been well advised or well informed, he would
have left his guns and wagons in the hope that by a swift dash over the
Modder he might still bring his army away in safety. He seems to have
underrated both the British numbers and the British activity.

On the night then of Friday, February 16th, Cronje lay upon the northern
bank of the Modder, with his stores and guns still intact, and no enemy
in front of him, though Knox's brigade and Hannay's Mounted Infantry
were behind. It was necessary for Cronje to cross the river in order to
be on the line for Bloemfontein. As the river tended to the north
the sooner he could cross the better. On the south side of the river,
however, were considerable British forces, and the obvious strategy was
to hurry them forward and to block every drift at which he could get
over. The river runs between very deep banks, so steep that one might
almost describe them as small cliffs, and there was no chance of a
horseman, far less a wagon, crossing at any point save those where the
convenience of traffic and the use of years had worn sloping paths down
to the shallows. The British knew exactly therefore what the places
were which had to be blocked. On the use made of the next few hours the
success or failure of the whole operation must depend.

The nearest drift to Cronje was only a mile or two distant, Klipkraal
the name; next to that the Paardeberg Drift; next to that the
Wolveskraal Drift, each about seven miles from the other. Had Cronje
pushed on instantly after the action, he might have got across at
Klipkraal. But men, horses, and bullocks w