the part of our artillery might have changed the fate of the
day, and it is bad policy to be too severe upon the man who has taken
a risk and failed. The whole operation, with its advance over the open
against a concealed enemy with a river in his front, was so absolutely
desperate that Long may have seen that only desperate measures could
save the situation. To bring guns into action in front of the infantry
without having clearly defined the position of the opposing infantry
must always remain one of the most hazardous ventures of war. 'It would
certainly be mere folly,' says Prince Kraft, 'to advance artillery to
within 600 or 800 yards of a position held by infantry unless the latter
were under the fire of infantry from an even shorter range.' This 'mere
folly' is exactly what Colonel Long did, but it must be remembered in
extenuation that he shared with others the idea that the Boers were up
on the hills, and had no inkling that their front trenches were down at
the river. With the imperfect means at his disposal he did such scouting
as he could, and if his fiery and impetuous spirit led him into a
position which cost him so dearly it is certainly more easy for the
critic to extenuate his fault than that subsequent one which allowed
the abandoned guns to fall into the hands of the enemy. Nor is there any
evidence that the loss of these guns did seriously affect the fate of
the action, for at those other parts of the field where the infantry had
the full and unceasing support of the artillery the result was not more
favourable than at the centre.

So much for Colenso. A more unsatisfactory and in some ways inexplicable
action is not to be found in the range of British military history.
And the fuller the light which has been poured upon it, the more
extraordinary does the battle appear. There are a preface and a sequel
to the action which have put a severe strain upon the charity which
the British public has always shown that it is prepared to extend to
a defeated General. The preface is that General Buller sent word to
General White that he proposed to attack upon the 17th, while the
actual attack was delivered upon the 15th, so that the garrison was
not prepared to make that demonstration which might have prevented the
besiegers from sending important reinforcements to Botha, had he needed
them. The sequel is more serious. Losing all heart at his defeat,
General Buller, although he had been officially informed that