e taught many and valuable
lessons, and it is perhaps proper to make a slight digression here and
show what some of these lessons are.

Let us then consider the deliberations of a board of naval officers,
some of the ablest experts in the service, appointed by Admiral Sampson,
after the battle of Santiago de Cuba, to report upon the condition of
Cervera's sunken fleet, the extent of damages done by American shells
and the lessons to be learned therefrom to guide the United States in
its future ship construction.

The conclusions reached by the board were as follows:

The use of wood in the construction and equipment of war ships should be
reduced to the utmost minimum possible.

Loaded torpedoes above the water line are a serious menace to the
vessels carrying them, and they should not be so carried by vessels
other than torpedo boats.

The value of rapid-fire batteries cannot be too highly estimated.

All water and steam pipes should be laid beneath the protective deck and
below the water line and fitted with risers at such points as may be
considered necessary.

The board also found that the ships Infanta Maria Teresa, Almirante
Oquendo and Viscaya were destroyed by conflagration, caused by the
explosion of shells in the interior, which set fire to the woodwork. The
upper deck and all other woodwork on their ships was entirely consumed
except the extremities. This shows the importance of fireproofing all
woodwork on board ships.

Many of the guns on board the burned ships were found loaded at the time
of the board's visit, indicating the haste with which the crews were
driven from the guns.

With talks with experts the following was developed as to what the war
showed:

First--That the gun is still the dominating factor in war.

Second--That rapid-fire guns are especially valuable, but that it is
advisable to retain guns of large calibres.

Third--That smokeless powder is absolutely essential for modern warfare.

Fourth--That there should be a great reduction in the amount of woodwork
on board ship and that that left on board should be fireproof, some
going so far as to say that woodwork should be eliminated entirely, its
place to be taken by some other substance.

Fifth--That armor should be distributed over the entire ship rather than
be limited to the section where its vitals are located.

Sixth--That monitors are useless for cruising purposes or for fighting
in rough waters.

Seventh--That the