explain and defend the treaty, was stoned and compelled to
retire. If the more violent opponents of the administration were to be
believed, its members, from the President down, and all the leading men
of the party supporting it, were bought by "British gold," or were ready
without being bought, but from pure original depravity, to betray their
own country and help to destroy France. The name of the ingenious
inventor of the argument of "British gold," then used for the first
time, has unfortunately been lost; but it has stood the test of a
hundred years' usage, and is as startling and conclusive to-day as it
was a century ago.

There soon came, however, the sober second thought which took into
consideration the circumstances under which the treaty was made, the
possible and even probable consequences of its rejection, as well as the
objections to the treaty itself. After the first excitement had passed
away, many thought it worth while to read for themselves what hitherto
they had only reviled at the suggestion of others, or from sympathy with
the popular clamor. The commercial community, the New York Chamber of
Commerce leading the way, came to the conclusion that their rights and
interests were reasonably protected; that to be recognized as a neutral
between two such belligerent powers as England and France was a great
point gained; that partial indemnity was better than total loss; and
that the chance of a fairly profitable trade in the future was
preferable to the ruin of all foreign commerce. It was universally
agreed that peace was better than war; but there was this difference
between the two parties: while one maintained that war was not a
necessary consequence of the rejection of the treaty, the other declared
it must be inevitable, where there were so many points of collision
which could only be escaped by mutual agreement. This was especially
true on the frontier, where Indian hostilities were sure to follow, and
lead to general war, if the military posts, which should have been given
up at the close of the Revolution, should remain longer in the hands of
the English.

But, after all, the real question with the Republicans was the influence
which a treaty with England might have upon the relations of France and
the United States. They detested England for her own sake; they detested
her still more for the sake of France. If there had been no question of
France in the way they would, perhaps, have been will