that he positively wished _not_ to have it. No one imagines
that he conceived the whole idea of enacting the law _after_ he had
prorogued the diet; certainly nothing new in the line of public danger
had arisen in those four days to justify the measure. Besides, he knew
that the House of Delegates would not have approved it. It was, in fact,
directly aimed at their supporters. A plainer attack on their
constitutional rights could hardly have been made.

But the delegates were sent home, so that they were now not able to
disturb the country by their debates. The Conservatives rejoiced in
this, seeming to think that the only real evil under which the country
was suffering was the 'gabbling' of the members of the diet. Moreover,
the press law, unwise and unconstitutional as many of the Conservatives
themselves considered and pronounced it, was in force, so that the
editorial demagogues also were under bit and bridle. It was hoped that
now quiet would be restored. The German diet at Frankfort-on-the-Maine
turned public attention for a time from the more purely internal
Prussian politics. But this was a very insufficient diversion. In fact,
the course of William I., in utterly refusing to have anything to do
with the proposed remodelling of the articles of confederation, the
object of which was to effect a firmer union of the German States,
although no Prussian had the utmost confidence in the sincerity of the
Austrian emperor, yet ran counter to the wishes of the Liberals, and
even of many Conservatives. The same feeling which fifty years ago gave
rise to the _Burschenschaft_ displayed itself unmistakably in the
enthusiasm with which Francis Joseph's invitation was welcomed by the
Germans in general. The king of Prussia did not dare to declare against
the proposed measure itself. Acknowledging the need of a revision of the
articles, he yet declined to take part in the diet, simply because, as
he said, before the princes themselves came together for so important a
deliberation, some preliminary negotiations should have taken place.
There is little reason to doubt, however, that his real motive was a
fear lest, if he should commit himself to the cause of German union, he
would seem to be working in the interests of the Liberals. For, as of
old, so now, the most enthusiastic advocates of a consolidation of the
German States are the most inclined to anti-monarchical principles;
naturally enough, since a firm union of states, utte