xpect that the contest
will become still more earnest. Only one turn of events can avert this:
the separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark in consequence of the
present war. If this is not the result, if nothing more is accomplished
than the restoration of the duchy to its former condition, the king will
lose the support of many Conservatives, and be still more bitterly
opposed by the Liberals. In addition to this is to be considered that
the war is carried on in spite of the refusal of the diet to authorize
the requisite loan; that, moreover, after vainly seeking to secure this
vote from the delegates, Minister Bismarck, in the name of the king,
prorogued the diet on the 25th of January, 1864, telling the Delegates
plainly that the money must be had, and accordingly that, if its use
were not regularly authorized, it must be taken by the Government
without such authority. His spirit may be gathered from a single remark
among the many bitter things which he had to say in the closing days of
the session: 'In order to gain your confidence, one must give one's self
up to you; what then would the ministers in future be but Parliamentary
ministers? To this condition, please God, we shall not be reduced.' The
spirit of the delegates is expressed in the question of one of their
number: 'Why does the Minister of State ask us to authorize the loan, if
he has no need of our consent--if we have not the right to say _No_?'
Brilliant successes of the Prussian arms, accomplishing substantially
the result for which the German people are all earnestly longing, may
restore the Government to temporary favor, and weaken the Progress
party; otherwise, as many Conservatives themselves confess, the king
will have paralyzed the arms of his own friends.

What is to be the end of this conflict between the Prussian Government
and the Prussian people? Without attempting to play the prophet's part,
we close by mentioning some considerations which must be taken into
account in forming a judgment. Although we have little doubt that the
present policy of the Government will not be permanently adhered to, we
do not anticipate any speedy or violent rupture. The case is in many
respects parallel to that of the quarrel between Charles I. and his
Parliaments; but the points of difference are sufficient to warrant the
expectation of a somewhat different result. Especially these: Charles
had no army of such size and efficiency that he could bid defiance